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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
The case at bar appears to be an exercise of this discretion. Whether the
discretion was exercised properly is open to conjecture. It can be argued that
since arbitration is voluntary and the parties have elected the forum in which
they wish to resolve their disputes, primarily because of the reputed prompt-
ness and finality of arbitration, the expected benefit must be weighed against
the possible detriment flowing from arbitration. Unless facts are shown to
have existed before or at the time of the making of the award which would
move a court of law or equity to deny enforcement of the award, (e.g. fraud,
illegality, overreaching, or a device to impose otherwise prohibited penalties
and forfeitures)ls such enforcement should be granted.
On the other hand, it can be effectively argued that such an award is a
violation of public policy and the court should have exercised its power in
vacating the award. Such an award contravenes deeply ingrained principles
and rules of equity jurisprudence regarding the specific performance of con-
tracts for personal service. "It would be intolerable if a man could be com-
pelled by a court of equity to serve another against his will, or if a man could
be compelled to retain in his employ one he does not want; courts of equity
exercise no such power and grant no such relief."' 4 In the case at bar, damages
would have been a proper remedy.
Apparently the Court felt that even though the granting of specific per-
formance of a personal employment contract could be considered a violation of
public policy, nevertheless, the argument in favor of upholding arbitration
awards outweighed those presented for vacating such an award.
STATE NOT LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE OF DOCTOR ExAmNING PRz FIGHTER
The question of whether the State of New York is liable for the negligence
of a doctor who examines price fighters prior to a fight was recently presented
to the Court of Appeals in the case of Rosensweig v. State.'5 The boxer in
question went into a coma and died after being knocked out in an authorized
boxing match in New York City. His administrator alleged that the doctor
who had examined him was negligent. The basis of his claim was that there
was a failure to determine that brain damage caused prior to the fatal fight had
rendered the deceased physically unfit to fight. Claiming that the examining
physician was an agent of the State, the plaintiff attempted to impute negli-
gence to it.
The Trial Court judgment for the administrator, was the result of finding
the doctor an agent of the State and finding him negligent.' 6 The Appellate
Division reversed, holding the proof insufficient as a matter of law to find the
doctor negligent.17 Without reaching the question of negligence, the Court of
13. Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 Fed. 246 (C.C. Mo. 1903).
14. In re Publishers Ass'n, 280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st Dep't 1952).
15. 5 N.Y.2d 404, 185 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1959).
16. 208 Misc. 1065, 146 N.Y.2d 589 (Ct. C1. 1955).
17. 5 A.D.2d 293, 171 N.Y.S.2d 912 (3d Dep't 1958).
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Appeals decided, 4 to 3, that the doctor was not an employee or agent of the
state, and therefore his negligence, if any, could not be imputed to the State.
In 1911 boxing was re-introduced in New York State after several decades
of complete prohibition. Legislation placed stringent regulations on the sport
and subjected it to the supervision of a newly created State Athletic Commis-
sion.' 8 The legislation had two main purposes: (1) a desire to prevent brutal
and degrading features which had previously permeated the contests, and (2) to
promote and protect such contests when conducted within the legitimate limits
of a sport.19
In 1920, the Walker Boxing Law invoked rigid supervision of matches
through a licensing procedure.20 The Walker law has remained basically intact,
but in 1951, when the bout which gave rise to this litigation took place, specific
language in the statute prescribed physical examinations for all boxers by a
Commission designated physician before each match.21 The corporation pro-
moting the fight paid the doctor for his services, but the amount of the fee was
determined by the Commission.
22
The majority in this case looked upon the restriction as a customary
exercise of police power, prompted by the public purpose of reducing the risk
of permanent injury to fighters. Nothing in the Walker Boxing Law or the
rules of the State Athletic Commission suggests that examining doctors, who
are paid by the fight promoter, are servants of the State, or, in performing
their duties, are subject to control or supervision by the Commission. The
State establishes the panel of physicians, but the promoter does the actual
employing from that panel. Theoretically, the promoter has a choice of doctors
from the panel, while in practice it has worked out that the examinations in
New York City bouts are invariably made by the same doctors.
The dissent felt that the State maintained such a close and exclusive
direction and control over the physical examinations of the boxers, and the
physicians who did the examining, as to render the State liable for the negli-
gence of the doctor. They relied on the "direction and control" criterion
as requiring a determination of liability.2 3
Perhaps it was this ostensible choice of panel doctors which remained with
the promoter, plus the fact that the promoter paid the physician's fee, that
prompted the court to decide that the doctor was not an agent or employee of
the State. In view of the strong direction and control argument of the dissent,
however, it appears likely that a broad policy reason was behind the decision.
A desire to protect the State's power to regulate, without incurring liability,
18. N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1911, c. 779.
19. Fitzsimmons v. N.Y. State Athletic Commission, 15 Misc. 831, 146 N.Y. Supp.
117 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd 162 App. Div. 904, 147 N.Y. Supp. 1111 (1st Dep't 1914).
20. N.Y. Sss. LAWS 1920, c. 912.
21. N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1948, c. 754, § S.
22. Id. § 2.
23. Baldwin v. Abraham, 57 App. Div. 67, 67 N.Y. Supp. 1079 (2d Dep't 1901),
aff'd 171 N.Y. 677, 64 N.E. 1118 (1902).
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.could have motivated the court to keep the state free from liability on the
master-servant principles on the facts presented in this case.
APPLICATION OF ESTOPPEL TO FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENT
The defendant, in International Firearms Co., Ltd. v. Kingston Trust
Company,24 sold a draft drawn on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
naming the plaintiff's predecessor in interest as payee. As per contract require-
ments, the buyer forwarded the draft to an escrow agent in Canada, where a
subsequent contract dispute was resolved by the Canadian courts in favor of
the plaintiff who was awarded the draft, which decision was here resisted. The
Appellate Division affirmed a judgment for the defendant,25 concluding that
while it may be true that once a bank draft, bought and paid for, has issued,
the transaction is complete and may not be rescinded,26 the defendant was
capable of defending suit on the draft by questioning the validity of the
plaintiff's title, which was found defective. The Court of Appeals reversed.
By permitting the defendant to contest the validity of the plaintiff's pos-
session, the lower courts were allowing a re-examination of the identical issue
settled by the Canadian judgment, and were not giving effect, as required
under principles of comity, to that judgment.27 Although the defendant was
not a party to the foreign action, the judgment rendered there precludes him
from asserting that title was not in the plaintiff, since the decree was not intro-
duced here as binding upon the rights of the defendant, but merely as a link in
the plaintiff's title.28
In Railroad Equipment Co. v. Blair,2 9 the plaintiff, in a previous suit, had
been awarded possession of freight cars in a replevin action against the de-
fendant therein, but the second defendant had resisted surrendering possession
claiming that plaintiff had never acquired the right of possession against the
former defendant. The Court held that while a former judgment is never
allowed to defeat any right existing in a person not a party, or his privy, it is
admissible against such person for purposes of proving that the plaintiff has
been clothed with whatever right the defendant therein had.
Under these decisions the defendant may still resist claims of ownership
by proving a defective title in the plaintiff, but is precluded from re-examining
the validity of a judicially forged link in the chain of title where a determina-
tion of his rights and interests were not involved. Under the instant decision
this is equally true when the judgment is of a foreign court as it is of a
domestic judgment.
24. 6 N.Y.2d 406, 189 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1959).
25. 6 A.D.2d 171, 175 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1958).
26. Kerr S. S. Co. v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and -China, 292 N.Y. 253,
54 N.E.2d 813 (1944).
27. Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y. Supp.
284 (1927), aff'd, 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927).
28. Barr v. Gratz' Heirs, 17 U.S. 213 (1819).
29. 145 N.Y. 607, 39 N.E. 962 (1895).
